The prominent place the war occupies in Afrikaner historiography and collective consciousness was underlined at a conference hosted by the War Museum of the Boer Republics, in Bloemfontein, in 1998. During the proceedings, an appeal was made for the identification of all the descendants of the Boers who collaborated in one or other way with the British. The lady, who made the politically impassioned call, argued that treachery was hereditary and that the Afrikaner people should know whom of their number carried the traitors' gene. Cooler minds and reasoned arguments made little impression. For her the war had not ended at Vereeniging. While she was inferring that the Afrikaners had been 'sold out' again in 1994, her statements more importantly reflect that the scars left by the Anglo-Boer War still run very deep through certain, if diminishing, portions of South African society and has been a major focus of Afrikaner history writing. This 'long war' phenomenon is not surprising. Arthur Marwick has explained, not perfectly, the interrelationship between war and society in terms of a four-tier model: based upon the examination of the disruptive and destructive aspects, the test set, the participation levels, and the psychological impact of the war. Using this or any other argument, few will argue that the war had little social, economic and political impact.
Radical historians, dismissing the traditional periodisation and moving toward a more interdisciplinary approach, concentrated upon social history and the writing of a total integrated history of all South Africans. As far as they were concerned, the Anglo-Boer War warranted little attention. W.M. Tsotsi denied the importance of both the Great Trek and Anglo-Boer wars and refused to see them in terms of anticolonialism and anti-imperialism, and as something comparable to the struggle against apartheid. Black radicals labelled blacks that had collaborated with whites as "traitors" and, when they did refer to the Anglo-Boer War, it was seen as "a war between English and Afrikaner exploiters fought on someone else's land.'" This has only relatively recently begun to change with a new approach to the war, focusing on the war experiences of black South Africans. With Philip Bonner, B. Hankey and Donald Denoon in the van, it culminated in the publication of Sol Plaatje's war diary (1973) According to Andreski's notion of the military participation ratio, the wartime gains by the less privileged members of society are dependent upon "the proportion of militarily utilised individuals in the total population.") The greater the participation of the less privileged, the more the social pyramid is flattened. This did not happen in South Africa, despite a reasonably wide participation by the entire population. The hensoppers and joiners enjoyed many benefits, mostly financial, while Milner and his successors were forced to resuscitate the rudimentary structure of Boer society after the war. Black people oppositely were sacrificed for the improvement of Anglo-Boer relations and their participation was not rewarded. Frustration set in and it was almost as if the war was blanked out of the black consciousness: Fransjohan Pretorius has even referred to a "blank black memory regarding the war." Nonetheless, the 2 nd Anglo-Boer War is clearly one of the crucial events in South African history and has been the subject of much research and reassessment, and the battle for the naming of the war reflects the tremendous impact it had on all the peoples of southern Africa. The South African War, the Second War of Independence, the English War and the Boer War all insufficiently describe the complexities of the conflict. The Anglo-Boer War -perhaps too simplistically -is taken from the two main belligerents, the parties who declared war. This has several problems. Firstly, it excludes the 'other' parties: the Cape Afrikaners, Australians, New Zealanders, Dutch, Belgians, Austrians, Russians, Germans, Frenchmen, Canadians, the Englishmen of Natal and the Cape, the so-called Uitlanders, and the thousands upon thousands of Black South Africans. Furthermore, it was not the second conflict between Boer and Briton. If one enumerates the events culminating at Bloomplaats (1848), the war, which erupted in 1899, must number as the 3 rd AngloBoer War. But then Free Staters have and will argue that they were not declared belligerents in 1880, and refer to the 1899-1902 conflict as the Anglo-Transvaal War! The 'Three Years War' (De Wet's terminology) is too vague yet perhaps the best of a poor list. Only once the shadows of the Bantu-Boer-Brit conflicts grow old and eventually disappear, will historians look upon these events with new-found clarity and objectivity. A hundred years from now, historians may very well group and refer to the conflicts of the nineteenth century -and perhaps even through to 1994 -as the wars of South African unification.
However, all tllis is not to say that the war had little to no impact upon the Dominions. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, this was their first foreign war and, as with Canada, a crucial nation-building experience. To mark the event, several centennial conferences were held, new books have appeared and numerous old titles have been republished. In all, five Boer War conferences were held during the last half of 1999: one each in the case of the United Kingdom, South Africa and Australia and two in New Zealand. For some, in the words of a well-known English historian of the war, this was fast becoming the 'Bore War.' Yet each occasion drew a surprisingly large crowd. In Britain and South Africa the gathering was largely academic: almost 100 historians from 17 countries presented papers at the Bloemfontein conference. In Australia it comprised a majority of military history buffs and in New Zealand, most astonishingly, the audience largely embraced descendants of soldiers who had served in South Africa. Some proudly wearing the medals of their ancestors posed a number of informative questions relating to "the methods of barbarism" as well as the virtues of colonial as opposed to imperial troops. This swell of popular support was also seen in the launch of a new New Zealand official history of the war 4 and a re-enactment of the march of the 1 51
Contingent from Karori down to Queen's Wharf in Wellington, the point of embarkation for South Africa. The governor general, Sir Michael Hardie Boys, used the opportunity to honour those who left on later service: "As the century has passed, we have learned that while there is genuine honour in military service, there is never, ever, any glory in war." While Prime Minister Jenny Shipley emphasised that the first of the ten New Zealand contingents that left for South Africa had, without knowing it, started New Zealand on her path to nationhood. s Memorial plaques were unveiled in several New Zealand towns, from Hamilton, North Island (26 Oct 1999) to Kaikoura, South Island (23 Oct 1999) .
According to the Chief of the Australian Army, Lt Gen F.J. Hickling, who opened the Canberra conference, the Anglo-Boer War saw the first use of Australian troops in Empire defence and the birth of the Australian Army on I March 190 I was the natural result. The British Empire did not emerge from the war unchanged. Hiatuses in an army designed only to 'police' were exposed by the unexpected intensity of the war. They also faced the dilemma of dealing with guerrilla-type armies without infringing the law of war and its conventions. Breaker Morant, antihero of the Stan Kubrick film, illustrated the point all too clearly for Australia.
Not surprisingly, the first Australian books on the war were produced very quickly, in fact long before the war even ended. They were W.T. 
